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During the 1980s many Pacific Island nations faced important policy
decisions in response to a proliferation of communication and informa-
tion technologies, many of which were offered to them by enterprising
foreign private interests. The launching of satellites with footprints over a
large part of the Pacific basin, as well as improved terrestrial broadcast
technologies, removed previous impediments to the establishment of
national television services, such as remoteness from capital cities and rug-
ged terrain. For the many Pacific Island nations without broadcast televi-
sion services, the potential incursion of these technologies has been a mat-
ter of caution and concern, as was expressed, for example, at the Pacific
Television Meeting sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union and
the South Pacific Commission (Horsfield 199oa, 1990b; cf Thirlwall and
Hughes 1989; Lie 1990).
The comparatively larger populations (by Pacific Island standards) in
both Papua New Guinea and Fiji, combined with the new technologies,
made the potential market for commercial television in these two nations
appear lucrative to a number of Australian and New Zealand entrepre-
neurs in the early 1980s (see Horsfield 1990b; PIM, May 1985, 33-35; April
1986,26; Oct 1986,25-26; Fell 1986). Against this background, Australian
Kerry Packer's Publishing and Broadcasting Limited company (PBL) made
successful proposals to both the governments of Fiji and Papua New
Guinea to set up commercial television stations in each country in 1985
and 1986 respectively. In Papua New Guinea, another Australian com-
pany, the Parry Corporation's Newcastle Broadcasting Network (NBN),
had also been granted a television license in 1984. In both countries the
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decisions to grant the licenses involved a reversal of long-standing govern-
ment policies that had given broadcast television a low priority compared
with other development needs. In both countries this low priority status
had resulted from many years of often extensive investigations into the
advisability of setting up broadcast television.
What were the reasons for this apparent change of heart toward televi-
sion on the part of the Fiji and Papua New Guinea governments in the
mid-198os? How much "room to maneuver" did each state actually have
in its policy-making process? In this paper we address these questions with
the assistance of the perspectives and findings of dependency theory. In
particular we focus on the nature of the processes of negotiation and on
the interface between transnational company and national government.
This interface is also the object of dependency theory. Thus, we explore
the dependency notion that weaknesses inherent in the political systems of
both countries, coupled with their respective histories of economic depen-
dency dating back to their colonial periods, may help to explain particular
political decisions.
THE RELEVANCE OF DEPENDENCY THEORIES
The introduction of new (or the expansion of existing) televisual services
within any country is inevitably linked with notions of economic develop-
ment and the provision of better, more sophisticated communication ser-
vices to government, business interests, and the population generally. In
developing nations such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea, the establishment
of communications infrastructure continues to be seen as important, both
to political aspects of "nation-building" and to the growth of an efficient,
modern economy.
Development is itself a problematic term whose meaning has been influ-
enced by several theoretical approaches. Development theory began in
earnest soon after World War II, with largely US-led initiatives to bring
the newly independent former colonial nations "up to the level" of the
industrialized world. The provision of communication infrastructure was
seen as facilitating a top-down diffusion model of development (Lerner
1957; Pool 1963).
The meaning of the term development is now in flux with the decline of
the classical model of modernization postulated by Lerner, and the cri-
tique of global inequalities initiated by dependency theories. Dependency
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theory was originally postulated by the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America in the 1950S and was then taken up in different ways by
economists and sociologists of the critical neo-Marxist school (see espe-
cially Prebisch 1963; Frank 1969; Amin 1982; Larrain 1989). In general
terms dependency theory contends that peripheral Third World nations
are systematically disadvantaged in the international marketplace by the
power of the central industrial states. Explanations for the impediments
to development can be found in a range of formulations of dependency
theory, including Seers' notion of the importance of a country's geographic
and historical specificities (1981), and Cardoso and Faletto's highlighting
of the importance of local relations between labor and capital (1979).
Another perspective is Wallerstein's world-system theory, which sees
dependency in global terms (Wallerstein 1982). According to this view, the
"communications revolution" ensures that the last frontiers of the devel-
oping world (Papua New Guinea and Fiji included) are incorporated into
the capitalist world system (Wallerstein 1990).
The notion of dependency has also been extended to include cultural
domination by the developed industrial nations (Smith 1982; Boyd-Barrett
1982; Tang and Chan 1990). The idea that communication media could
exacerbate dependent relationships was applied by communication re-
searchers such as Nordenstreng and Varis (1974), Nordenstreng and Schil-
ler (1979), Tunstall (1977), Smythe (1981), and others who formulated the-
ories of cultural and media imperialism. The UNESCO call for a New
World Information and Communication Order (MacBride 1980) arose
directly from international debates informed by the application of depen-
dency theory to an increasingly international media industry that was con-
trolled predominantly by the wealthy industrial nations. Dependency the-
ory has been criticized for failing to account for individual countries'
specificities (Seers 1981), and for recommending restrictions on the free
flow of information. However, dependency theory continues to be of par-
ticular relevance to non-Western (or "non-Northern") perspectives on
communication theory and on explaining government policy-making pro-
cesses generally (see Fisk 1970; Hagan 1987; Samana 1988; Horsfield
1990b ).
For the purposes of this paper dependency theory is relevant to the
question of whether governments such as those in Fiji and Papua New
Guinea actually had "a choice" when it came to accepting or rejecting the
foreign television companies. The answer may lie in the articulation of
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each country's political processes with the interests and representatives of
foreign capital (Robinson 1972; Seers 1981; Stauffer 1983). In their writ-
ings on dependency theory, Cardoso and Faletto describe the "new" form
of development in which "the public sector, the multinational corpora-
tion, and the modern capitalist sector of the national economy are joined,"
a union that "requires the economic action of these various groups to be
possible politically" (1979, 163). The compliant role of the national gov-
ernment in neutralizing objections to the entry of the foreign company is
vital to the company. This support may be expressed in terms of a myth of
development that stresses the development benefits said to flow from the
introduction of television. Local hegemonic interests also hope that televi-
sion will facilitate the reelection of the government. However, as this
study will show, a totally compliant relationship between the foreign tele-
vision company and the state is not necessarily guaranteed. Many local
factors can intervene to destabilize such a brittle alliance, as Australian
entrepreneurs discovered to their cost. The haphazard and idiosyncratic
nature of politics in Papua New Guinea has been well documented
(Morauta 1986; Samana 1988; Turner 1990). In Fiji, the military coups of
1987 demonstrated the fragility of the syncretism of the British Westmin-
ster-style parliamentary system and the traditional chiefly system, against
a background of increasing demands for equal representation by a grow-
ing population of Fiji Indians and the reactions of the indigenous elite and
taukei-ni-vanua 'people of the land' to these demands (Tarte 1987; Scarr
1988; Norton 1990; Garrett 1990).
In the cases under consideration, an alliance of sorts did emerge
between state and foreign capital, which made the introduction of televi-
sion politically possible. This alliance was facilitated by a series of accom-
modations by each side (elaborated later):
the very attractive "no cost" proposals presented by the foreign televi-
sion entrepreneurs;
a seemingly radical departure by the government from previous televi-
sion policies;
political processes and commercial negotiations that favored secrecy
and irregularities; and
the apparent blurring by political leaders of the "development" benefits
of television with the leaders' own personal and electoral needs, and
the identification by foreign entrepreneurs of their own interests as
the "public interest."
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However, the two case studies discussed here also provide some evi-
dence that the processes that increase dependent relationships are far from
inevitable. Foremost among this evidence is the resistance or obstruction
provided to commercial television by political opponents to Mara in Fiji
and Somare in Papua New Guinea, by social and religious leaders (espe-
cially in Fiji), and, ironically, by the very unpredictable and idiosyncratic
political processes inherent in both countries, which had facilitated the
acceptance of the foreign television companies in the first place.
The Attractive Foreign Television Proposal
The changes in television policy in Fiji and Papua New Guinea should be
viewed in the context of Australian policy toward the Pacific, as well as
the state of Australia's television industry in the mid-I980s. During the
I980s Australia felt an increasing need to be a visible presence in the
Pacific region (Hayden I987, I7S-I76), prompted partly by the growing
interest of other foreign presences in establishing their influence there:
Libya, the USSR, France, Japan, the United States, and China. Communi-
cations technology was perceived as one way to maintain an Australian
presence in the Pacific. With the launch of the first Aussat satellite in I98S,
Australia hoped to gain a strong foothold in communications in the
Pacific.
The I980s were an important time for the Australian television indus-
try, a time when the possibilities of satellite delivery of television and tele-
communications generally were exciting government bodies and private
business enterprises alike. Networking across the Australian continent
held the promise of greater economies of scale than had previously been
possible for stations broadcasting mainly to the capital city audiences of
Sydney or Melbourne. At this time the television companies were still in
relatively sound financial health and looking for new markets. Expansion
in Australia was limited by the ownership rules of the Broadcasting Act of
I942, and in this context the Pacific Island nations, despite their modest
economies, were viewed as attractive television markets by new and old
television entrepreneurs (PIM, April I986, 26).
Kerry Packer's Australian Channel 9 network had, in I984, made an
offer to six Pacific nations of so hours of selected international television
programming daily via the Intelsat satellite, at a cost to each country of
A$IOO,OOO (us$69,000) for ground receiving stations. The offer had Aus-
tralian government support, including technical and production training.
In I986, too late to beat Packer into the Pacific, Television New Zealand
·'
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proposed to the South Pacific Forum countries that it broadcast public ser-
vice television to the region via Intelsat. Alan Martin of that company
argued that Pacific nations "have a right to expect that television will be
used to protect local culture [and that the] stimuli for behaviour and stan-
dards should still come from local pulpits ... and not from the West
Coast of America" (PIM, Oct 1986, 25). The Forum declined the New
Zealand offer, mainly for financial reasons, and Fiji accepted Packer's
proposal.
One year earlier, in 1983, a local video production company in Papua
New Guinea invited in Newcastle Broadcasting Network 3, a subsidiary
of the Perth-based Parry Corporation, to help them set up Papua New
Guinea's first broadcast television station. After only a few weeks, the net-
work dispensed with the local company, and by the end of 1984 had suc-
cessfully negotiated with the Cabinet of Prime Minister Michael Somare
for a license to operate the country's first broadcast television station.
Changes to Previous Television Policies
In both Papua New Guinea and Fiji, government decisions to introduce
commercial broadcast television appeared to contradict existing policy
regarding television. The Papua New Guinea government's granting of the
license to Newcastle Broadcasting Network, which resulted in the net-
work broadcasting only to the National Capital District (around Port
Moresby), was a major departure from previous government policy, docu-
mented in Cabinet decisions of 1982, 1983, and 1984 (PNG, 28 May 1985,
24), which had agreed to use Aussat to provide, among other things, a
nationwide radio and television service under the auspices of the state-
owned National Broadcasting Commission. The granting of the license
departed from the findings of several government inquiries into the feasi-
bility and advisability of introducing television to Papua New Guinea,
conducted several times over the previous eighteen years. These enquiries
had generally concluded that television was a low priority in the country's
economic development, and that if it were introduced at all, it would
focus on educational uses (Broadbent 1966; McNamara 1972; Lepani
1977; Kalo 1987).
In Fiji, television had also been resisted, chiefly on "quality of life"
grounds, with the Christian churches exercising a major influence. Several
factors underlay Fijian resistance to broadcast television: the need for a
prior electrification of the whole nation to prevent "an unwanted rural
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migration to the urban areas" (Bongiovani I983), the low priority of televi-
sion in terms of development needs; the inclusion only of urban districts in
the broadcast area; the lack of success of early experimental television
projects (Bentley I982; Kua I983); the importation of alien ethical values;
and the deformation of ways of life, such as rural workers neglecting work
to watch daytime television (Anderson I98o).
In both countries, concern had been expressed that Pacific Island com-
munities needed protecting from US-dominated mass cultural products.
Papua New Guinea Opposition Leader Paias Wingti expressed concern
about the potential harm that unregulated foreign programs might do to
local languages, cultures, and the formation of cultural identity among
young people (TPNG, 8 Aug I986, 6). However, in the case of Fiji at least,
some commentators felt that these fears had been exaggerated: Fears of a
population gorged on a Coca-Cola culture to the exclusion of its own heri-
tage are probably unfounded. The commercial stations will conform to
sensible regulations covering content-if only to protect their licenses. In
any case, most island cultures are vital and dynamic and probably well
able to recover from the initial shock of broadcast television. They are
not, as some people fear, unable to look after their traditions (PIM, Oct
I986,5)·
Apparent Irregularities in Decision-making Procedures
The decisions to grant broadcasting licenses to foreign commercial com-
panies were not only a surprising departure from both nations' previous
policies, but they were also characterized by minimal public debate and
apparent irregularities at the level of negotiation, perhaps because of a
sense of urgency on the part of both prime ministers to have the licenses
granted quickly. For example, in Papua New Guinea, Parry's Newcastle
Broadcasting Network originally began negotiating with the local licens-
ing authority, the Posts and Telecommunications department. However,
when the department advised the government that controls were needed in
the form of a broadcasting tribunal, it was replaced in the negotiations by
an interdepartmental committee set up especially to make recommenda-
tions to Cabinet on the introduction of television. This committee in turn
was replaced some five months after it was constituted because it, too,
recommended proceeding cautiously. In its place a special state negotiat-
ing team was formed consisting of the departments of the Prime Minister,
Finance and Planning, and the State Solicitor. This team had the specific
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task of negotiating with Newcastle Broadcasting Network and Niugini
Television Network for the introduction of television (Kalo I987, 96).
Given the obvious pressure that was coming from "high levels" in gov-
ernment, including Prime Minister Michael Somare, it was not surprising
that Cabinet decided in November I984 to direct Posts and Telecommuni-
cations to grant Niugini Television Network a license to commence com-
mercial television broadcasting in Papua New Guinea as soon as possible.
In addition to the "fast-track" given to the negotiations, other irregulari-
ties were apparent. These included the absence of Deputy Prime Minister
Paias Wingti from the Cabinet meeting at which the licensing decision was
made, and the fact that Sir Ebia Olewale, an old friend of Somare's, had
been given a IO percent share of the new company in return for services
rendered to it and to Newcastle Broadcasting Network. Subsequently, the
opposition inferred in Parliament that Sir Ebia used his friendship with
Somare, and his government connections, to smooth Newcastle Broad-
casting Network's passage through Cabinet (PNG, 5 Nov I984, 8; pC,S
Nov I984). Later, when Wingti had defected from the ruling Pangu Pati,
largely over the television issue, and was leader of the opposition, he
alleged that two senior government officials regularly conveyed confiden-
tial information relating to Cabinet discussions and deliberations to the
representatives of Newcastle Broadcasting Network (PNG, 28 May
I98S, I7)·
Somare and Communications Minister Roy Evara consistently failed to
answer these allegations about the irregularity of the negotiations, leaving
themselves open to charges of impropriety. The effect of the irregularities
was that the government rushed through the agreement with Niugini Tele-
vision Network "without proper planning, prior debate or sufficient con-
sideration of the entire issue" (PNG, 6 June I98S, 22-23). It could further be
argued that the granting of another television license, to Media Niugini
(backed by Publishing and Broadcasting Limited) in March I986, was a
clear rebuttal of Somare's critics, eager to portray him as having a vested
interest in Niugini Television Network.
With the idiosyncratic nature of politics in Papua New Guinea (often
labeled "the land of the unexpected"), such an action as licensing a second
television station was scarcely surprising. One could argue that such a
move on Somare's part signaled an irreverent form of resistance, a refusal
to allow Papua New Guinea to be shackled by the monopolistic ambitions
of one foreign television company. This "each-way bet" phenomenon is
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not unusual with leaders of less wealthy countries when negotiating mutu-
ally advantageous deals with foreign companies.
In Fiji, as in Papua New Guinea, the decision to introduce broadcast
television seemed to be influenced more by arguments put by foreign tele-
vision companies than by local public debate or government priorities. In
Fiji, too, negotiations were characterized by certain irregularities. Here,
the people of Fiji had even fewer opportunities to debate the television
issue-prior to decisions being taken-than had those of Papua New
Guinea. An agreement was made by Prime Minister Ratu Mara's Alliance
Party government in July 1984 to grant a broadcast television license to
Kerry Packer's Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, but the agreement
was not made public until some eleven months later. There were allega-
tions of F$30,000 (us$18,000) kickbacks to Suva city councillors for sur-
rendering undeveloped parkland to the Crown so that the council could
fulfil its agreed contribution of a site for lease to the newly formed Fiji
Television Corporation for its new premises (FT, 8 June 1987,3).
Not until after the signing of the agreement with Publishing and Broad-
casting Limited did the Fiji government announce that "matters relating to
television are open to parliamentary debate" (FT, 27 Mar 1986). However,
the debate was restricted to formulating the enabling legislation, not
whether or not television should commence, or what form it should take.
Public debate questioned both the secrecy surrounding the agreement and
the advantage it was felt the company had been given. Both the Labour
coalition opposition and the press criticized the fact that detailed submis-
sions had not been sought from other companies because the government
had already accepted Channel 9'S offer (FT, 22 Mar 1986; Keith-Reid
1986). Six other companies, including Parry's Newcastle Broadcasting
Network and Television South Pacific Limited (a local company) had orig-
inally applied to set up a television service but only Publishing and Broad-
casting Limited was asked for a detailed submission. A further controver-
sial aspect of its negotiations with the Fiji government was the company's
recruitment in Fiji of Australian Information Service Officer Warwick
Cooper to work on its satellite interests, while on twelve months' leave of
absence from his employer. Suspicions were that Cooper, as a public ser-
vant, "might be involved in a conflict of interest" (NT, 20-26 Dec 1985).
Prior to the government calling for submissions to set up television,
Kerry Packer and Lynton Taylor, head of Publishing and Broadcasting
Limited, went to Fiji in September 1985, to have talks with the govern-
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ment. They returned "with the contract in their hands" (FT, 22 MAR 1986).
Taylor claimed that this preproposal meeting was not unfair, but rather a
result of the company's "entrepreneurial spirit" (FT, 22 Mar 1986). Robert
Keith-Reid, Suva editor of Islands Business magazine, believed that Pack-
er's success was "just plain lucky" (Keith-Reid 1987): Packer and Taylor
simply happened to arrive in Fiji to coincide with Ratu Mara's announce-
ment, giving their company a clear field as no other potential competitors
were aware at the time of the change of policy. If this was a genuine coin-
cidence, their arrival was indeed fortuitous.
Peter Stinson, minister for Economic Development and Planning, felt
the government's method of dealing with a foreign company was justified:
"Even if the Press does not like the way we went about the whole thing, I
don't think they can deny that we have got a damn good deal" (FT, 13 Aug
1986). Regrettably, Stinson did not elaborate on the business ethics of the
deal, or define "good" in relation to other possible offers. Just as in Papua
New Guinea, the decision to accept Packer's offer was made, not by the
Parliament, but by a Cabinet committee-the Television Facilitation
Committee-a circumstance that guaranteed secrecy because the commit-
tee's proceedings were not available to the Parliament.
No doubt there were advantages for both Publishing and Broadcasting
Limited and the Fiji government in the agreement that was finally drawn
up between them. The company was to provide the entire working capital
of about F$S.S million (U5$3.3 million), all of which would presumably
come from Australia, "preventing an outflow [from Fiji] of foreign
exchange and enhancing foreign exchange receipts" (FT, 22 Mar 1986, 3).
Fiji Television would be allowed to transmit locally and to receive Intelsat
television programs from Sydney for rebroadcast. The license gave it a
twelve-year monopoly, after which the government could allow other
companies to provide domestic television services. Control of Fiji Televi-
sion and its programming would be vested in a board of five directors,
three of whom would be local people. A "Television Broadcasting Act"
would help regulate program content, which would be drafted on the
results of a planned social impact study.
The social impact survey seems to have been intended to defuse con-
cerns about the sociocultural impact of television. This survey, paid for by
Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, Was done by the Roy Morgan
Research Centre of Melbourne. Two Roy Morgan employees came to Fiji
for a month and visited the two main islands of Vitu Levu and Vanua
Levu. They worked with the support of a government-appointed advisory
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committee made up of the deputy manager of the Fijian Broadcasting
Commission; a planter from the north; a former senator, Reverend S. Ya-
baki; and the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Information. The
committee was set up hurriedly and asked to cover a wide range of issues
and to nominate key informants. However, when it wanted to seek sub-
missions directly from the public, the Roy Morgan researchers ruled that
it was not part of their brief from Publishing and Broadcasting Limited.
The notion of any form of independence in the study is highly question-
able. The survey sample of "54 people from various walks of life and eth-
nic groups" (Keith-Reid 1987), with 35 of them from Suva, was perceived
by the Fiji press as unrepresentative in a country of 700,000 people. Keith-
Reid, a respected local journalist and editor, stated that the Roy Morgan
study was a farce and was not really a social impact study at all, but sim-
ply market research to plan advertising and choice of program content.
He also queried how television could be monitored before it began broad-
casting. The study's suggestion that a government body monitor content
was regarded skeptically by some, such as the Reverend Yabaki, who
opposed monitoring if it meant censorship, and believed prior vetting of
the considerable volume of programs would be impractical (Yabaki 1987).
In effect, the station would be left to choose program content without
input from the people of Fiji and with likely detriment to local content.
Blurring ofPersonal, Commercial, and Public Interests
Mattelart, Delacourt, and Mattelart have argued that it is not inevitable
that economically underdeveloped nations become dependent on rich
nations and on transnational capital for the development of viable film
and television industries or services, with the consequent saturation of the
underdeveloped nation with foreign cultural products (1984). Rather, they
have argued, the state may have more power than is commonly believed.
However, most Third World states tend not to exercise this power for the
benefit of their people but have tended to identify with the power elites,
usually in the national capital, who form "organic alliances [with]
transnational capital on the basis of common interests" (Mattelart, Dela-
court, and Mattelart 1984, 64).
We shall now examine these "common interests" more closely, as they
relate to the activities of Australian television companies and the govern-
ments of Fiji and Papua New Guinea during the mid-1980s. Some of the
interests of the television companies in setting up stations in two major
Pacific Island nations have already been stated: these two countries held
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the promise of an increased market for the Australian companies. The
market prospects would be even greater if a long monopoly could be nego-
tiated, as occurred in Fiji. Satellite and improved broadcast technology
seemed to allow for previously unheard-of economies of scale, if the cen-
tralized networking that characterized Australian television could be
expanded across the Pacific.
The advertising potential in Fiji particularly, but also in Papua New
Guinea with its large number of foreign and transnational companies, was
a strong motivating factor for the television companies. However, this
very advertising-the heart of commercial television's profit-exercises a
strong control over program content and is in potential conflict with any
regulatory function a government might seek to exercise. Commercial
interests argue that this is true democracy, because the people are voting
for programs with the ratings. The issue of regulation became a key com-
ponent of the Wingti government's attack on television during its early
months of office in 1987. Publishing and Broadcasting Limited expected to
make a clear profit of F$600,000 to F$1 million per year (U5$360,000 to
u5$600 ,000) selling largely foreign content via Intelsat to Suva (FT, 13 Aug
1986). Ross Addison, of the Wilson Addison advertising company in Suva,
was optimistic about Fiji Television's likely profitability. For example,
transnationals such as Colgate-Palmolive and Westpac had said they
would double their Fiji advertising budgets for television (Addison 1987).
Addison said that the prime target of advertising would be the "Fiji-Indian
housewife." However, as the Morgan report noted, the profitability of
advertising would depend on the popularity of the programs shown. The
report claimed that if program content were "heavily skewed to informa-
tion and education and ... the entertainment component [were] a com-
bination of the best available outside Fiji mixed with as much quality local
product as possible" then Fiji Television might fail "to attract significant
audiences in order to satisfy advertisers" and would require sponsors not
only to pay for air time but to underwrite the costs of "quality local pro-
grams" (Morgan 1986). Thus, Morgan plausibly introduced the commer-
cial rationale for including a high level of cheap, "ready-made" imported
program material, with little allowance for local programming beyond
low-cost news and current affairs shows. This rationale put the notion of
development clearly in commercial terms, rather than in such terms as
might have been worked out by the governments of Fiji and Papua New
Guinea in consultation with their citizens for their long-term benefit.
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In Papua New Guinea, similar operating principles for the profitability
of the television station were articulated by the two companies. Profits
would depend on advertising contracts, which would be motivated in
Media Niugini's view by the vast pool of untapped consumer wealth pre-
sumed to exist in the mineral-rich highland provinces (Thorley 1987), and,
in Niugini Television Network's view, by the large expatriate and local
population living in the National Capital District. The failure of either
Parry's Niugini Television Network or Packer's Media Niugini to procure
a monopoly similar to the Fiji Television agreement in Fiji surely reduced
this potential for profit. In Papua New Guinea also, the National Indus-
tries Development Authority required that ownership of all foreign-owned
companies be devolved largely (70 percent) to Papua New Guineans
within twenty years of registering as a Papua New Guinea company.
A strong incentive for short- rather than long-term profitability had
emerged. The implications for programming are that foreign entertain-
ment programs are favored over more expensive local productions.
The twenty-year time-frame necessary for profitability was probably
underestimated by Publishing and Broadcasting Limited, as Bond Media's
marketing manager later acknowledged: "It's not going to be easy to make
a profit in Papua New Guinea.... Eventually Bond will make money,
but it's going to take a fair while for that to happen, and that's ignoring
the government policy of eventual 100 percent national ownership" (Hall
1988). Niugini Television Network, on the other hand, realized that its
chances for profitability were severely diminished when the Papua New
Guinea government granted the second television license to Media Niugini
(Finlay 1987). The network's perceived profitability was confined largely
to the expatriate audiences in the National Capital District and to adver-
tising contracts with large local and multinational companies. It had no
intention of exploiting the potentially lucrative highland audiences (Finlay
1987). Since its diminished profitability was directly related to their loss of
monopoly, this further points to the possibility that in removing that
monopoly, Somare (in dependency theory terms) was offering "resistance"
to the commercial "force."
In Fiji, however, Publishing and Broadcasting Limited succeeded in
eliminating business competition. As one of Packer's station managers
later said of Packer's (and later Bond's) push into the Pacific: "If someone
else comes in there, that wouldn't be so easy for Bond" (Hall 1988). The
twelve-year monopoly the company negotiated with Ratu Mara's govern-
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1993
ment would appear to have averted this problem. Papua New Guinea
represented for Bond Media (PBL'S successor company) an important link
in that company's planned worldwide satellite organization, which in-
cluded the United Kingdom, China, New Zealand, Australia, the Cook
Islands, and Chile.
So much for the interests of the television companies. The benefits that
the Mara and Somare governments saw for granting television licenses to
foreign commercial companies have been articulated by the politicians
themselves in varying degrees of explicitness. The major benefits appear
to be electoral. Both Ratu Mara and Michael Somare were facing immi-
nent elections and both had promised that television would be introduced
in time for them. Somare had the added incentive of giving the Papua New
Guinea people television in time for the tenth anniversary of independence
(in 1985).
That politicians have often exploited the relationship between accessi-
bility to centralized information and political hegemony has been docu-
mented (Katz and Wedell 1978; Mattelart, Delacourt, and Mattelart
1984). It is likely that both Somare and Ratu Mara saw benefits in televi-
sion as a tool to inform an ethnically disparate and geographically scat-
tered electorate of the positive achievements of the central government. In
addition, videocassette recorders were becoming very popular, even in
areas away from the national capitals, and the popularity of a government
that added a national broadcast television to the proliferating (but non-
centralized) videocassettes would seem greatly enhanced.
Some indication of Somare's personal enthusiasm for the project is
shown in one of his speeches to Parliament: "The company will be trying
[television] out in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt Hagen and Goroka. I wish they
had included Wewak [center of Somare's own East Sepik electorate]
because I would really love it, but they did not" (PNG, 27 May 1985, 5). In
addition, Murray Finlay, manager of Newcastle Broadcasting Network's
newly formed Papua New Guinea company, Niugini Television Network
stated: "We were more than welcomed by the government of the day ...
and the Somare government ... was in a mood of wanting to attract for-
eign investment of all types and when the offer came along from a foreign
company to come and establish a television service, it was welcomed"
(Finlay 1987).
As justification for the decision, Somare and the then Communications
Minister Roy Evara offered five reasons for granting a license to Niugini
Television Network. The service would, they claimed, offer a large
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amount of programming in education and health issues (PNG, 5 Nov 1984,
10). There would be a steadily increasing level of local content, beginning
at 20 percent, as the television station became more established (PNG, 28
May 1985). There would also be majority Papua New Guinea ownership
of the network (pc, 9 Nov 1984). It was claimed, too, that the television
service would be introduced at no cost to the government. However, this
has not been clearly established, since Papua New Guinea's Posts and
Telecommunications department was supposed to be investing in the
microwave bearers for the service (PNG, 5 Nov 1984, 9; 28 May 1985, 22).
Finally, Somare and Evara emphasized that "television is already in Papua
New Guinea" in the form of cable, video, and satellite, with the implica-
tion that the introduction of a broadcast service would allow it to be regu-
lated-in contrast with the other unregulated televisual services (PNG, 5
Nov 1984, 9).
Ratu Mara's personal enthusiasm for broadcast television has not been
as well documented as Somare's. However, Ratu Mara had announced as
early as September 1985 that Fiji would get broadcast television before the
next election (due in early 1987) (FT, 21 Sept 1985, 3, 6). He attempted to
placate anti-television groups in Fiji with the promise of a social impact
survey to ascertain the type of television the people of Fiji wanted (FT, 3
July 1986,10).
It is therefore reasonable to assume that both Somare and Mara
believed they stood to make some political gains from having television
established in their countries as a tool for commercial, economic, and
social development. Both leaders were facing elections (in which each ulti-
mately failed to be reelected). In addition to the perceived electoral advan-
tage, it is also very likely that each leader saw the nation-building poten-
tial of television. Moreover, in both Fiji and Papua New Guinea the
television companies had strongly emphasized social and economic bene-
fits during the negotiation process. Finlay's comments about the Papua
New Guinean's "enormous thirst for information" and Hall's comments
about Fiji's commercial development typify this emphasis (Finlay 1987;
Hall 1987).1
OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE
In neither Fiji nor Papua New Guinea was the momentary intersection of
local political and foreign commercial interests a guarantee of long-term
commercial success. The dependency process was neither inevitable nor
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predetermined. Resistance emerged from the obvious quarters of the par-
liamentary opposition and the social conservatives, including religious,
educational, and traditional leaders. Both countries also possessed some
institutional channels through which opposition could be expressed, with
varying levels of effectiveness.
The most notable opposition to commercial television in Papua New
Guinea came from Paias Wingti, for whom television was one of the issues
that helped galvanize his political opposition to Somare. When unsuccess-
ful in fighting the issue at Cabinet level, he fought it in Parliament as
leader of the opposition. Once elected prime minister (for his first term),
he first asked Niugini Television Network to delay beginning transmission
until the results of an inquiry into broadcasting were made available (Kalo
1987). When the network refused, Wingti attempted to use the legislature
to reverse the decision to allow it to commence broadcasting (the Televi-
sion Control and Prohibition Act). In turn, the network resorted to the
judicial system to fight Wingti's legislation, and the Supreme Court of
Papua New Guinea found the Act unconstitutional. Wingti's Communica-
tions Minister, Gabriel Ramoi, attempted several times to put in place leg-
islation that would regulate initially only broadcasting, but later all Papua
New Guinea media. However, this all-inclusive legislation was never put
to parliamentary vote because of persistent and vocal opposition from the
established print media. The television stations had been in favor of the
establishment of a regulatory tribunal, because they felt it would bring the
other media (including videocassette recorders, pay-television, and the
press) under the same technical and local content obligations as they
themselves operated. Despite these various attempts to resist and then
control television, there is still no set of guidelines or regulations govern-
ing television broadcasting that might embody the countless submissions
by a wide range of Papua New Guinea people to the inquiry into broad-
casting ofJanuary 1987 (Finlay 1987; PNG, 26 Feb 1987,17; Kalo 1987).
More subtle undermining of the profitability of the commercial televi-
sion companies was present in the "hard-bargaining" tactics of the Papua
New Guinea government during the negotiations. The issue of who was to
pay for the microwave bearers to transmit television to other major cen-
ters outside Port Moresby (a development not encompassed within Niu-
gini Television Network's original plans) considerably delayed the agree-
ment between the network and the government, to the financial detriment
of the network. In Fiji also, most of the hardware costs of installing televi-
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sion were to be borne by the company, with the government largely pro-
viding land. In Papua New Guinea, Niugini Television Network had also
failed to get the government to invest directly in their station (as Publish-
ing and Broadcasting Limited had been able to do in Fiji), thus taking on
themselves almost all the burden of expenditure for setting up the station.
In Fiji, opposition to television came more from conservative social
forces such as church leaders. While not actually opposing the introduc-
tion of television, the Reverend Yabaki of the Fijian Council of Churches,
an adviser to the government on television policy, argued that stronger
legislation was needed to control the commercial company and that stric-
ter control be directed toward developing more endogenous program-
ming, in spite of the stated extra expense (Yabaki 1987). Opposition to
commercial television in Fiji also came from the press, who feared a popu-
lar competitor. Vijendra Kamar, editor of the Fiji Times, argued that tele-
vision should be state owned, because of the medium's power, and that its
introduction should be delayed until it was affordable and certain to
present programs that would foster Fiji's varied cultures (Kamar 1987).
Kamar, together with the manager of FM-96 and the editor of Pacific
Islands Monthly, also feared that the advertising "cake" would be sliced
too finely if commercial television were introduced.
Religious and community leaders consulted by the Roy Morgan com-
pany when conducting its social impact survey did succeed in having some
of their views represented in the final report. The report's recommenda-
tions included guidelines for programming, such as controls on sexual
explicitness and violence; bans on cigarette and alcohol advertising; posi-
tive injunctions for the promotion of Fijian culture; production of special
rural, women's, and children's programs; and for programs to be sched-
uled to avoid working hours.
However, in Fiji, just as in Papua New Guinea, the legislation to
embody the concerns of the religious and community leaders was not
drawn up or enacted prior to the signing of the agreement with the foreign
television company. Moreover, the agreement with Publishing and Broad-
casting Limited in Fiji stipulated that "the government cannot promote
legislation that goes against the agreement, and must consult with F-TV
where practicable, on any proposed legislation" (FT, 13 Aug 1986, I).
The Fiji Labour Party was another source of opposition. They disap-
proved of the awarding of a twelve-year monopoly to Publishing and
Broadcasting Limited without a prior independent social impact study
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(PIM, Dec 1986, 8). On its election to government in April 1987, the new
Labour coalition government immediately announced that there would be
a review of the television agreement, and "a further social impact study
emphasising the importance of local content" (Australian, 27 April
1987,18).
The coalition government was prevented from following through by
the military coup of May 1987, the negative economic effects of which led
to Fiji Television paying off its local workers and all expatriate workers
returning to Australia by the end of 1987. Fears of increased interference
from Christian religious leaders and greater levels of government control
were also motivating factors in Bond Media's departure. Neither the Fiji
government nor Bond Media ever withdrew from the original agreement,
but it was effectively nullified when the station failed to go to air by the
February 1988 deadline. Apart from closed-circuit marketplace "warm-
ups," Fiji Television never commenced transmission.
Following the 1987 coup the re~formedRatu Mara government became
more circumspect in its consideration of further offers of television from
foreign companies. However, it has still not set up processes for public
consultation on the issue. Despite its calling for and receiving a number of
tenders in 1990 from local and overseas interests, the Fiji government, at
the close of 1991, was still delaying any decision on a domestic television
service (Huddy 1991).
Meanwhile, in Pa.pua New Guinea, Niugini Television Network found
itself at the end of 1987-its first year of operation-in an uneasy compro-
mise with the state. By March 1988, the network, which had said it could
never make a profit while more than one television company was operat-
ing in Papua New Guinea, ceased operation. The reasons for its closure
related partly to the ailing financial position of the parent company, Parry
Corporation, and partly to the unrecovered expenditure on the network
itself. Niugini Television Network had failed to negotiate the monopoly it
claimed to need for profitability; it had failed to get a large share of Papua
New Guinean investment and, perhaps more important, it had failed to
get the government to invest directly in the station. Had it continued oper-
ating, it would presumably have had to divest a majority of its shares to
local people within twenty years, according to Papua New Guinea law.
Media Niugini then appeared to be the winner. By 1988 it had expanded
its operation to Lae on the northern coast via land transmitters and by the
end of 1989 had extended transmission to at least seven other urban and
STEWART ET AL. • TELEVISION AND DEPENDENCY 3S1
mining centers, making use of Bond Media's access to the Intelsat satellite.
It had also made compromises, such as being prepared to put to air non-
broadcast-quality government education and health programs (Thorley
1987), thereby considerably enhancing its standing with the administra-
tion. These contrasted with Niugini Television Network's more rigid
policies.
And the government and people of Papua New Guinea? They have a
broadcast television service that provides limited representation of them-
selves and their country in locally produced programs and advertisements
that make up roughly 20 percent of viewing time. However, it is not a tele-
vision "of the people," but very much an imported institution in which cul-
ture is largely interpreted for the people by foreign managers who are
short-term residents of the capital city.
The frustration felt by many Papua New Guinean policymakers in rela-
tion to television in their country was expressed eloquently by Communi-
cations Minister Brown Sinamoi at the Pacific Regional Television Confer-
ence in Suva in November 1989:
Television in its various forms is already in Papua New Guinea, but it is in a
chaotic and most unsatisfactory state. None of them can be considered or
accepted as promoting Papua New Guinea cultural values. Because of lack of
adequate television policies by successive governments, a situation has been
reached in Papua New Guinea that would not be tolerated in most other coun-
tries. (Horsfield I990b, 14)
CONCLUSIONS
Writing about the dialectics of the expansion of the Australian manufac-
turing industry into Indonesia in the early 1970s, Short gave as the major
reasons for the investment decision "the limited size of the [Australian]
domestic market and the desire to promote export goods and services"
(1978, lIS). A similar desire to expand beyond the limited domestic market
motivated the television companies and their clients, the advertisers, in the
1980s. In the case of expansion into Papua New Guinea and Fiji, it could
be added that, although profits from the new ventures would have been
neither immediate nor very great, by becoming established in those partic-
ular markets, the respective companies were hoping to keep competitors
out. For Bond Media in particular, Papua New Guinea was intended as
part of that company's planned worldwide satellite organization.
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The current financial problems of the Australian television industry,
which have resulted, among other things, in the return of Kerry Packer as
owner of the Channel 9 network after Alan Bond's ignominious exit, may
suggest that Australian television incursions into the Pacific during the
I980s were transitory and unlikely to be repeated. However, such a view
would underestimate the underlying strength of the Australian television
and telecommunications industries. The Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation International (OTCI), for example, has been very successful in
marketing communications hardware to Kiribati and in the cooperative
development of telecommunications infrastructures in Vietnam and Laos.
It is now generally acknowledged that the disastrous state of the Austra-
lian television industry is due to the then owners' miscalculations, rather
than to any crippling malaise in the industry as such. Moreover, even as
television networks are suffering both financial woes and a poor public
image in the Pacific because of the forays reported here, other "players"
are positioning for entry. Perhaps the most noteworthy are Television
New Zealand's services in Niue, Nauru, and the Chatham Islands and
their involvement with Cook Islands Television. The Australian company
OTCI did put in a bid for supplying a television service for Fiji, but has
recently withdrawn from the tendering process (Huddy I99I). In turn, the
Fiji government has been conducting a more orderly processing of the
recent bids than of the earlier ones, but still without public consultation or
debate.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests, that any profits to be
made by foreign television companies from either Fiji or Papua New
Guinea will be minimal. The same "Pacific way" that facilitated the entry
of the foreign companies into both countries has apparently worked
against any hopes the companies may have had that Pacific television was
"a license to print money." The syncretism of British political and judicial
institutions and Melanesian traditions produces anomalies that often take
Westerners by surprise. Thus, Niugini Television Network may have won
the court case against the Papua New Guinea government, but they lost
the battle for a monopoly and subsequent profitability. Bond Media in
Fiji, with its twelve-year monopoly and its 80 percent ownership of Fiji
Television, had its seemingly secure profitability irreparably undermined
by the political changes of I987 and the consequent economic decline.
Being aware of the outcomes, we may see the irony of the methods used
by the television companies to gain a foothold in each of the two nations.
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There was, for example, an apparent sensitivity in both organizations to
accusations of "imperialism": Packer's negotiator, Lynton Taylor, was
keen to point out that, "We were invited in" to Fiji and other Pacific Island
countries by the respective governments (PIM, May 1985, 33). The rhetoric
was added that the television companies were essentially local companies,
with a predominance of locally recruited workers, some of whom were
already well known in radio. Each company adopted a strong local image
-national symbols formed part of each company's logo-and in Papua
New Guinea, Tok Pisin words occur in the very names of the companies:
Niugini Television Network, Media Niugini, EM-TV (em is a Tok Pisin
word for "the," implying "the one and only"). Another similarity is that
influential local figures such as Olewale and Cooper were employed by
Niugini Television Network and Fiji Television respectively to smooth the
way for the company's negotiators.
Crucial to the question of communications policy in countries such as
Papua New Guinea and Fiji is the issue of development. Several United
Nations conferences of nonaligned nations, beginning with Lusaka in
1970, have linked national communications policies with a movement
toward self-reliance in development that is concerned not with "technical
progress and industrialisation" but with "the satisfying of fundamental
needs-food, clothing, housing, education, self-fulfilment, participation,
togetherness and conviviality" (Mattelart, Delacourt, and Mattelart
1984). In this view culture becomes "a field for political emancipation"
(Mattelart, Delacourt, and Mattelart 1984). The incursions of foreign-
owned television monopolies, with their accountability to transnational
advertisers, is not conducive to collective participation in the communica-
tions planning process.
Why, then, were the Somare and Mara governments willing to accept
these foreign television deals? Perhaps part of the answer lies in the myth
of development that is central to the rhetoric employed by leaders such as
Somare and Ratu Mara and his spokesman, Peter Stinson. The rhetoric
that television will promote the development of the country is rendered
palatable to its population when combined with a growing demand for
television's entertainment and information functions resulting from al-
most a decade of exposure to pirated videotapes of off-air Australian and
New Zealand (and US) television programs.
The choices faced by the prime ministers of Fiji and Papua New Guinea
at the time of the foreign television offers were not simple. In each case the
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establishment of television had previously been accorded a low priority:
the establishment of largely foreign-owned commercial television had to
overcome substantial political, social, and ideological objections. Perhaps
Sir Michael Somare and Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara are modern examples of
"indigenous political . . . collaborators" succumbing to "the allure of
what the big society had to offer in terms of trade, capital, technology"
(Robinson 1972, 120). Clearly, they were attracted by the possibility of
getting television in time for their election campaigns. They may also have
been motivated by the desire to give the people a "gift"-in Somare's case
(ironically) for the tenth anniversary of independence from Australian
mandate rule. Somare's position was somewhere between Wingti's desire
to preserve the culture from excessive exposure to materialist Western
values and practices, and the desire to encourage foreign investment in a
developing capitalist economy. At least partly for reasons of self-interest,
Somare came out on the side of the foreign company, as did Ratu Mara.
This notion of "self-interest," when pursued to the extent of what is
known in many Western democracies as "corruption," is explained by
Turner as a function of the imposition of Western democratic institutions
and principles on traditional Melanesian political institutions (Turner
199°,143),
The arbitrariness of the decision-making process, in terms of the lack of
an orderly bidding process and of public consultation, is evident in both
Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The lack of consultation, the secrecy, and the
bypassing of the recommendations of previous government inquiries are
features of communications policymaking not peculiar to Pacific Island
nations. Similarly, the use of "social impact" studies such as the Roy
Morgan study in Fiji is now a familiar ploy in attempts to diffuse contro-
versial issues. Yet the experience reported here with nonindependent ,
commercially sponsored social impact studies should not discourage
Pacific Island governments from initiating more rigorous, independent
studies that may genuinely contribute to policymaking. At the same time,
foreign entrepreneurs should not underestimate the strength and subtlety
of the resistance that may be offered to them by Pacific Island govern-
ments.
Our conclusions about our appropriation of dependency theory are
somewhat mixed. In some ways the postulated vulnerability of dependent
states has been confirmed, perhaps more vividly in the case of Papua New
Guinea. However, the sheer volatility of local political processes, fueled
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by nationalist and conservative elements to the extent that they can gain
access to the political process, must surely temper any temptation to reach
preconceived conclusions about the outcomes of negotiations under con-
ditions of dependency. If dependency theory has focused on how the
incursions of foreign capital are made politically possible, then it needs
also to specify the conditions under which such incursions become, if not
impossible, then difficult, unstable, and suboptimal for all concerned.
AFTERWORD
Since 1987 both the Fijian and Papua New Guinean governments have
shown increasing concern about the quality and development of broadcast
television in their respective countries. Fiji, despite a number of tenders
from foreign television interests seeking to establish television in the archi-
pelago, has maintained a more independent attitude toward television.
Through the tendering experience, Fiji's politicians and public servants
have no doubt learned much about financing and managing a television
service, and are now not so easily won by foreign media owners' promises
of an ideal television service.
Since 1985, Television New Zealand has established an image as a
Pacific television provider that has the interests of Pacific Islanders at
heart. For example, it had a major role in establishing Cook Islands Tele-
vision in late 1990. Interestingly, the Cook Islands government chose to
ignore the New Zealand company's advice that it would not be feasible for
Cook Islands Television to supply some of its own program content
through endogenous production, and has been successfully producing an
hour of local material each week. In this way Cook Islands Television has
shown that some independence from hegemonic foreign broadcast prac-
tices is possible in the Pacific.
The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding between Televi-
sion New Zealand and the Fiji government gives the government 100 per-
cent ownership of the new Fiji Broadcasting and Television Corporation,
but Television New Zealand is awarded only a technical and managerial
role. This is a result of the Fijian government's continued postcoup policy
of dabe wawa, ka rai (don't rush-let them come to you; sit back and wait
and see). Such a stance has allowed the government to retain the initiative,
set the agenda, and control the pace of television development, a stance
that contrasts sharply with the more laissez-faire attitudes of the precoup
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government of Ratu Mara. In addition, the Rabuka government is show-
ing a strong interest in developing local production.
In Papua New Guinea, EM-TV remains the sole television provider,
although some expatriates and wealthier Papua New Guineans also have
access to satellite channels such as North Queensland Television (NQTV)
from Australia, and Malaysian and Indonesian channels. After five years
of operation, EM-TV is still not showing a profit, although general man-
ager John Taylor believes it is "well on the way" to doing so (Taylor 1992).
Local productions still represent less than 20 percent of its programming.
Taylor claims that getting sponsorship for local productions is generally
more difficult than for more popular foreign shows such as "A Current
Affair" (from Australia).
EM-TV'S experience over the last five years has shown that Papua New
Guinean audiences prefer to watch overseas programs rather than local
productions. This claim is supported by Times of Papua New Guinea
journalist Anna Solomon, who adds that EM-TV is least popular with audi-
ences who have access to satellite television (Solomon 1992). The com-
pany is hoping to achieve commercial viability for endogenous produc-
tions, but this is related to the experience of production crews and to
audience acceptance, which Taylor believes will take some years to
achieve.
One clear exception is "Mekim Musik," a program that shows local and
overseas music video clips. Recent indications are that a local music indus-
try has begun. The program has high levels of audience acceptance and
sponsorship.
Other examples of recent local productions are "Ah Great Coffee" (a
prize-winning documentary) and an eight-part miniseries about life in a
squatter settlement that has so far not been aired because of lack of spon-
sorship. However, Taylor believes that confidence in local productions
will come as audiences become more experienced with the range of televi-
sion genres. The other side of this coin is that audiences who rarely see
their own cultures represented on television are unlikely to develop an
appreciation of local programs. The refusal of the commercial station to
take the financial risks associated with making and showing local produc-
tions is a more subtle working out of dependency theory.
Furthermore, the few fledgling local television production industries in
the Pacific Islands may have even stronger competition when the full effect
of the current proliferation of Pacific satellite footprints is felt.
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The existing Pacific satellites, Intelsat, Inmarsat, Peacesat and Aussat, con-
nect Pacific countries to distant parts of the world, and more satellites are
being planned. For example the Inmarsat's Project Iridium will put 77 mobile
satellites in low polar orbits around the earth.... Moreover, Papua New
Guinea and Tonga are acquiring satellite rights. (Horsfield, Stewart, and
Plange 1992)
Competition among satellite providers may well result in a new wave of
entrepreneurs trying to secure television deals with Pacific governments-
an outcome that may ultimately prove disadvantageous to both the island
nations and the satellite owners. A proliferation of satellite-delivered tele-
vision is unlikely to contain a very high percentage of locally produced
programs. Satellite delivery also raises further questions about the extent
to which national governments would be able to control television. Under
such a delivery system, cultural and economic dependency may be difficult
for Pacific nations to avoid.
Note
I Fiji Television Manager John Hall used the term development to mean
expansion of the Fiji economy, especially in the commercial sector. He felt com-
mercial television would contribute to this "development" by increasing sales of
existing products and creating markets for new products (Hall 1987).
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Abstract
Dependency theory continues to offer the development researcher attractive pos-
sibilities for heuristic claims about relationships of cultural or economic depen-
dency between nations. However, as recent work on dependency theory-for
example, by Larrain (1990) and Wallerstein (1990)-demonstrates, claims that
dependency theory provides a valuable explanatory tool must take into account
the specific social, cultural, and economic circumstances and idiosyncrasies of
that country. That is, dependency theory must always be a possible conclusion,
rather than a premise, of investigation. Dependency theory must be answerable,
therefore, to empirical investigation.
This paper details two empirical studies that furnish data for evaluating the
validity of applying dependency theory to an understanding of the socioeconomic
impact of televisual development in the Pacific. In the mid-1980s both Fiji and
Papua New Guinea leaped enthusiastically into agreements with Australian
media interests to introduce broadcast television into those countries. An exami-
nation of the policy formulation and decision-making processes of both Fijian
and Papua New Guinean governments at the time shows that politicians in both
Suva and Port Moresby did not cope well with the incompatible needs of profit-
oriented foreign media entrepreneurs and development-oriented national groups.
This paper therefore focuses on the period of the early negotiations and deal-
making in the two countries, during the mid-1980s and on the social, political,
and economic consequences of the resulting deals for both television institutions
and their target audiences. It is argued that these consequences have been condu-
cive to relations of cultural and economic dependency.
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